Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 04315 01 OF 03 271659Z ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 EPG-02 DODE-00 EB-07 FEAE-00 FPC-01 H-01 INR-07 INT-05 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 OES-07 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 NRC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 ARAE-00 ERDE-00 DHA-02 IGA-02 EA-07 /152 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1874

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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US MISSION IAEA VIENNA 248

US MISSION EC BRUSSELS 317

AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 4315

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TAGS TECH ENRG PARM BR GW

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TOPICS IN THE BRAZILIAN PRESS

REFS (A) BRASILIA 3662 (NOTAL), (B) BRASILIA 4219 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO BRAZIL STRONGLY CRITICIZED VERTICAL ARMS PROLIFERATORS, WHILE JUSTIFYING THE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. IN A STATEMENT TO A GERMAN TV JOURNALIST, BRAZIL'S FINANCE MINISTER ALLEGEDLY INTIMATED THAT BRAZIL MIGHT ACCEPT MINOR CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 04315 01 OF 03 271659Z

NUCLEAR AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT SIMONSEN IMPROVISED AN APPARENTLY OFFICIAL PRESS BACKGROUNDER CLAIMED BRAZIL WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR STUDIES, UNLESS THEIR PURPOSE WAS LEFT VAGUE INTENTIONALLY IN ORDER THAT THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT COULD BE DISCUSSED. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A BRAZILIAN JOURNALIST, IAEA ASSISTANTDIRECTOR-GENERAL FISHER CRITICIZED US NUCLEAR POLICIES, AND SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE BRAZIL HAD UNDERTAKEN A COMPLETE

NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN ORDER TO BUILD A BOMB. SEVERAL OF FISHER'S COMMENTS, IN OUR JUDGMENT, WERE UNHELPFUL. THEY FURTHER REINFORMCE WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A BRAZILIAN PERDEPTION THAT, INITS NUCLEAR POLICY THE US INCREASINGLY IS ISOLATED SAVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

- 2. BRAZILIAN-NIGERIAN COMMUNIQUE. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION (MAY 24) OF THE NIGERNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO BRAZIL DEALT WITH DISARMAMENT AND ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH OF THE COMMUNIOUE STATED: "WITH RESPECT TO DISARMAMENT, THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE RESUTLS OBTAINED TO DATE FROM THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING, PARTICULARLY IN THEI FIELD OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THEY OBSERVED WITH CONCERN THAT STATES ENDOWED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS, (THOSE) PRINCIPALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT, HAVE NOT CARRIED OUT NEGOTIATIONS TO THAT END WITH THE REQUIRED URGENCY; ON THE OTHER HAND, NEW MODELS OF SOPHISTICATED ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CONTINUE TO BE DEVELOPED AND PERFECTED... THEY AGREED THAT ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL ENDS OUGHT TO BE CONCEDED TO COUNTIRES WHICH DESIRE TO UTILIZE IT IN THE PRO-MOTION OF THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT. WITH APPROPRIATE AND ACCEPTABLE SAFEGUARDS AND WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION."
- 3. COMMENTS BY FINANCE MINISTER SIMONWEN TO A GERMAN JOURNALIST. A GERMAN TV JOURNALIST, GUENTER EDERER, ACCORDING TO O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO (MAY 24),
 DISCUSSED NUCLEAR ISSUES WITH FINANCE MINISTER SIMONSEN IN A RECENT INTERVIEW. EDERER REPORTEDLY INFORMED SIMONSEN ABOUT A CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 03 BRASIL 04315 01 OF 03 271659Z

HE (EDERER) HAD WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SHORTLY AFTER THE LONDON SUMMIT. SCHMIDT ALLEGEDLY TOLD EDERER THAT: "WEST GERMANY COULD NOT RESIST STRONG AMERICAN PRESSURES AGAINST FURNISHING A REPROCESSING PLANT, ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER QUESTIONED THE BRAZILIANGERMAN AGREEMENT ITSELF. FOR THIS REASON, THE MOST VIABLE OUT WOULD BE FOR BRAZIL TO ACCEPT A STRONGER PLEDGE TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FURNISHING GUARANTEES THAT IT WILL NOT MAKE ATOMIC ARMS, EVEN AFTER THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT DISCONTINUES IN FORCE."

4. SOMONSEN, APPARENTLY RESPONDING TO EDERER'S REMARKS, AFFIRMED THAT THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO BRAZIL, BUT THE COUNTRY "WILL NOT FIGHT FOR EVERY COMMA"

IN IT, SO LONG AS BRAZIL'S SOVEREIGNTY TO PLAN ITS ENERGY POLICY AND TO DEVELOP TECHNOLOGICALLY IS NOT AFFECTED. IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO US DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRG AND THE GOB, SIMONSEN REPORTEDLY SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS. HE CONSIDERED AS FINISHED THE AGGRESSIVE PHASE OF

PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. WERE THE AGREEMENT NOT TO BE CARRIED OUT, HOWEVER, SIMONSEN FORESAW A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISASTER, WHICH WOULD AFFECT BRAZIL'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH GERMANY.

5. EDERER, ACCORDING TO O ESTADO, LEFT HIS HALF-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH SIMONSEN CONVINCED THAT BRAZIL WILL ACCEPT A SUPPLEMENTARY CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WILL PLEDGE BRAZIL TO FULFILL THE RIGOROUS SAFEGUARDS CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT EVEN AFTER ITS EXPIRATION. (COMMENT: AS ADDRESSEES ARE AWARE, THE BRAZIL "FRG/IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT CONTAINS NO EXPIRATION DATE FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS.) EDERER COMMENTED FURTHER THAT HE HAD ACCOMPANIED PRESIDENT CARTER IN HIS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. THROUGH THIS, EDERER HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT CARTER, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION, WOULD ADVANCE AT ANY PRICE HIS PURPOSE OF AVOIDING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE WORLD. EDERER REPORTEDLY COMMENTED THAT ALL POLITICAL PARTIES ANDPUBLIC OPINION IN GERMANY SUPPORT THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT. NEVERCONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 04315 01 OF 03 271659Z

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 04315 02 OF 03 271711Z ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 EPG-02 DODE-00 EB-07 FEAE-00 FPC-01 H-01 INR-07 INT-05 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 OES-07 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 NRC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 ARAE-00 ERDE-00 DHA-02 IGA-02 EA-07 /152 W

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P R 271530Z MAY 77
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1875
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
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AMEMBASSY CARACAS

US MISSION IAEA VIENNA 249 US MISSION EC BRUSSELS 318 AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 3 BRASILIA 4315

THAT THIS SUPPORT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND THE AGREEMENT WOULD NO LONGER BE SUSTAINABLE, IF THERE WERE A RECRUDESCENCE OF DISRESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRAZIL.

6. BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR POLICY. ON SUNDAY, MAY 15, JORNAL DO BRASIL, IN A STORY DATELINED WASHINGTON, REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD INVITED BRAZIL AND 23 OTHER NATIONS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A REV-EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF AVOIDING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS. THE NEXT DAY, JORNAL REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S INITIATIVE FOR AN "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE" HAD COME AS NO SURPRISE TO BRAZILIAN DIPLOMATS. FOLLOWING DEPUTY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 04315 02 OF 03 271711Z

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S VISIT TO BRAZIL, THEY HAD FORESEEN THAT IN THE NEXT STAGE THE US WOULD TRY TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE QUESTION, THUS MASKING THE US'S DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT IN THE VOTES OF TENS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. JORNAL ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH ITAMARATY (THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS) HAD NOT COMMENTED OFFICIALLY ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S INITIATIVE, IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE GOB TENDED TO MAINTAIN ITSELF APART FROM ANY UNDETAKING AIRMED AT CREATING NEW OBSTACLES TO THE REALIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR POLICY APPROVED BY PRESIDENT GEISEL."

7. THAT DAY (MAY 16), ITAMARATY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING NOTED:
"ITAMARATY HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTENTION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS WITH RESPECT TO A PROGRAM OF
EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. THE PRECISE FORM
WHICH THE ORGANIZATION OF SUCH MEETINGS WOULD TEAKE WOULD BE DECIDED
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH INTERESTED COUNTRIES. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE
INDICATIONS, THE BASIC OBJECTIVE WOULD BE THAT OF ESTABLISHING A
NUMBER OF COORDINATED PROGRAMS OF RESEARCH AND STUDY. ITAMARATY
HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY INVITATION TO A SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK. IT IS RECORDED FOR THE RECORD
THAT BRAZIL ALWAYS HAS DECLARED ITSELF DIRECTLY INTERESTED IN,
AND READY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PERFECTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES
TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS."

8. IN APPARENTLY EXTEMPORANEOUS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS ON MAY 19, FONMIN SILVEIRA TOUCHED ON THE SAME THEME (JORNAL, MAY 20): "
WE KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING THE STUDY AND EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. WE WERE INFORMED (OF THIS) BY THE UNITED STATES ITSELF, BUT NOT OF A FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR A

MEETING, AND MUCH LESS OF ONE WITH THE SPECIFICATION THAT IT WOULD BE 24 COUNTRIES. THIS INFORMATION, WHICH CAME IN A PAPER WHICH THE AMERICANS CALLED A NON-PAPER (THAT IS, ONLY AN INFORMATIONAL PAPER), IS BEING STUDIED BY US." SILVEIRA REPORTEDLY COMMENTED THAT BRAZIL DID NOT SIGN THE NPT "FOR HISTORICAL REASONS." HE ADDED: "WE DO NOT HAVE A PRECONCEIVED POSITION IN RELATION TO THIS TREATY--ONLY THAT IS DISCRIMINATORY. IF IT IS RENEGOTIATED OR AMENDED, WE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 03 BRASIL 04315 02 OF 03 271711Z

ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM AND TO RECONSIDER OUR POSITION."

9. IN AN APPARENT OFFICIAL DEEP BACKGROUNDER, JORNAL ON MAY 17 REPORTED THAT BRAZIL WOULD NOT OPPOSE ANY PROPOSAL TO STUDY AMPLI-FICATION OF ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, TO DEFINE NORMS FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, OR TO PERFECT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CURRENTLY KNOWN. THERE WILL BE OPPOSITION FROM BRAZIL. HOWEVER. IF "THE THEME OF THE CONFERENCE IS VAGUE, IN ORDER THAT THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT, OR SOME OF ITS ESSENTIAL PARTS, COULD BE PUT TO DISCUSS-ION." "BRAZILIAN ATTENTION AT THE MOMENT", ACCORDING TO JORNAL, "IS FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE US WANTS TO CONVOKE A CONFERENCE IN ORDER, UNDER THE COVER OF A VAGUE THEME, TO PLACE IN DISCUSSION THE MECHANICS OF REPROCESSING. BRAZIL IS READY TO DEFEND AT ANY MOMENT AND IN ANY INSTANCE THE REPROCESSING PLANT THAT (IS) SO CONTESTED BY THE US. AND BRAZILIAN APPREHENSION IS GREATER AT THE MOMENT BECAUSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY TODMAN MADE CLEAR TO CHANCELLOR SILVEIRA THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SUBJECT CLOSED."

10. IAEA OFFICIAL EXPRESSES CONFIDENCE IN BRAZILIAN INTENTIONS.
IAEA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL ADRIAN FISHER COMMENTED ON BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND OTHER NUCLEAR TOPICS IN AN INTERVIEW IN SALZBURG WITH JORNAL DO BRASIL'S ARLETTE CHAMBROL PUBLISHED ON MAY 15. EXCERPTS FOLLOW. (A) CHABRAL ASKED WHETHER BRAZIL DESIRED TO UNDERTAKE A COMPLETE NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN ORDER TO BUILD A BOMB. CHABREL SAID SHE HAD HEARD THIS THEME IN THE CORRIDORS AT SALZBURG. FISHER RESPONDED: "NO, I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS. THE SAME THING WAS SAID ABOUT ARGENTINA 10 YEARS AGO BUT IT

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 04315 03 OF 03 271709Z ACTION ARA-10 INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 EPG-02 DODE-00 EB-07 FEAE-00 FPC-01 H-01 INR-07 INT-05 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OMB-01 PM-04 USIA-06 OES-07 SP-02 SS-15 STR-04 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 NRC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 ARAE-00 DHA-02 IGA-02 EA-07 /152 W

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
US MISSION IAEA VIENNA 250

US MISSION EC BRUSSELS 319 AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 3 OF 3 BRASILIA 4315

TURNED OUT TO BE FALSE. NUCLEBRAS HAS ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE WHOLE PROGRAM AND ITS OBJECTIVE IS TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR ENERGY. FURTHERMORE, IF BRAZIL TRULY HAD MILITARY OBJECTIVES, IT WOULD HAVE CHOSEN ANOTHER WAY. WE HAVE EXAMPLES IN FRONT OF OUR EYES. COUNTRIES THAT DESIRE TO BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB BEGIN BY BUYING A RESEARCH REACTOR OR BY DEVELOPING A FUEL CYCLE. INDEPENDENTLY AND WITHOUT GUARANATEES. THIS IS NOT THE CASE OF BRAZIL, WHICH ACCEPTED VERY AMPLE GUARANTEES."

(B) CHAMBROL ASKED IF BRAZIL SEEMED TODAY MORE-THAN-EVER DECIDED AGAINST BEING INFLUENCED TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE NPT, AND IF THE AMERICAN POSITION HAD PROVOKED AN EFFECT CONTRARY TO WHAT HAD BEEN SOUGHT. FISHER ANSWERED: "I BELIEVE YOU ARE RIGHT. THE CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 04315 03 OF 03 271709Z

PRESSURE WAS TOO STRONG AND ONLY MANAGED TO OBTAIN A CONTRARY EFFECT. I FELT THE SAME REACTION AMONG THE JAPANESE AND AMONG OTHER NATIONS AS WELL." (C) CHAMBROL ASKED WHETHER FISHER, LIKE MANY IN SALZBURG, BELIEVED THE POSITION OF THE US HAD DISCREDITED THE NPT. FISHER REPLIED THAT IT IS "CERTAINLY VERY DIFFICULT" TO CONCILIATE ARTICLE 4 OF THE NPT WITH A "POLICY OF RESTRICTION."

(D) FOLLOWING AN ELABORATION BY FISHER OF THE IAEA CONTROLS ON THE BRAZILIAN-GERMAN PROGRAM, CHAMBROL ASKED WHETHER BRAZIL COULD ESCAPE FROM THE CONTROLS. FISHER RESPONDED: "EVIDENTLY IT CAN CONSTRUCT A CYCLE PERFECTLY INDEPENDENT OF THE FIRST (COMMENT:

GERMAN) CYCLE WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO SAFEGUARDS. IT CAN ALSO DENOUNCE THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 20 YEARS FROM NOW. BUT ANY COUNTRY WHICH HAS RATIFIED THE NPT ALSO CAN, WITH THREE MONTHS NOTICE, ABANDON IT, ALLEGING URGENT REASONS." (COMMENT. AS WE READ IT, THE TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT CONTAINS NO 20-YEAR DENUNCIATION PRIVILEGE.)

- (3) CHAMBROL ASKED WHAT FISHER THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION FOR A REGIONAL CENTER TO REPROCESS FUEL UTILIZED IN BRAZIL. FISHER REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS AN "EXCELLENT IDEA," BUT IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE ARGENTINES AND CHILEANS, AS WELL AS BY THE BRAZILIANS.
- (F) CHAMBROL ASKED WHAT FISHER SAW AS THE LESSONS OF THE SALZBURG CONFERENCE. FISHER REPLIED THAT IT WAS "VERY VALUABLE." IT "SAW THE BIRTH OF A TRUE DIALOGUE" BETWEEN SUPPLIERS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND LDG'S ANXIOUS TO ACQUIRE IT. FISHER CONTINUED: "THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NEW AMERICAN PROLICY PROVOKED MUCH CRITICISM AT THE END OF LAST MONTH. THERE WAS A VERY STRONG EMOTIONAL EXPLOSION AT THE PERSEPOLIS CONFERENCE. IN SALZBURG, A ZONE OF UNDERSTANDING WAS SOUGHT.... IT WAS DISCUSSED SERIOUSLY. BECAUSE, AT BOTTOM, IT IS EVIDENT THAT ALL THE POLICY OF RESTRITION CANNOT BE DECIDED UNILATERALLY. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND THER OTHERS DISCUSS IT TOGETHER."

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 04315 03 OF 03 271709Z

- 11. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. THE PRESS HAS CONTINUED TO GIVE SUBSTANTIAL COVERAGE TO WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO US NUCLEAR POLICY. PROMINENT EXAMPLES INCLUDE: A STATEMENT BY JAPAN'S ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CHIEF SOSUKE UNO ACCUSING US OFFICIALS OF ACTING IN BAD FAITH IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOJ; THE FRENCH ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS CHEMICAL ENRICHMENT PROCESS; THE SALZBURG AND LONDON SUPPLIERS MEETINGS; INTERNAL GERMAN OPPOSIION TO REACTOR CONSTRUCTION. DR. BRZEZINSKI'S AIRPLANE INTERVIEW ON THE WAY HOME FROM THE LONDON SUMMIT WAS GENEROUSLY EXCEPTED IN THE BRAZILIAN PRESS. REF. B CONTAINS SEVERAL REMAKRS BY FONMIN SILVEIRA ON NUCLEAR POLICY. END UNCLASSIFED-BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL
- 12. COMMENT: THE ATTACK ON VERTICAL PROLIFERATORS IN THE BRAZILIAN-NIGERIAN COMMUNIQUE SEEMED STRONGER THAN WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED. ALTHOUGH THE BRAZILIANS THEMSELVES OCCASIONALLY MAKE SUCH ATTACKS, THEY DO NOT USUALLY APPEAR IN JOINT COMMUNIQUES.
- 13. SIMONSEN'S ALLEGED STATEMENT THAT BRAZIL "WILL NOT FIGHT FOR EVERY COMMA" IN THE BRAZILILIAN-GERMAN AGREEMENT STRIKES US AS UNNECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE STATEMENT, IF MADE, WAS IMPROVISED.

14. THE REPORTED COMMENTS OF IAEA'S ADRIAN FISHERZ, AND OF EARLIER REMARKS BY DG EKLUND, TAKEN TOGETHER HAVE LEFT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION IN THE BRAZILIAN PRESS THAT THE IAEA HAS, AT MINIMUM, STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT US NUCLEAR POLICY. THE COMMENTS BY IAEA OFFICIALS FURTHER REINFORMCE WHAT WE BELIEVE IS A PERCEPTION OF THE AVERAGE INFORMED BRAZILIAN THAT US NUCLEAR POLICY IS INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR AMONG BOTH DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED NATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

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